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Abstract
Existing literature sees opportunistic behaviour of contractual partners as the
main reason why rational agents underinvest in relationship-speci￿c assets. We
look beyond this well-know holdup problem and argue that ￿nancial vulnerability
and short-term planning horizon can also lead to such underinvestment. Subse-
quently, banks can stimulate growth-enhancing investment in relationship-speci￿c
assets by signalling creditworthiness and long-term planning horizon of their bor-
rowers. We empirically con￿rm this hypothesis by showing that industries depen-
dent on relationship-speci￿c investment from their suppliers grow disproportion-
ately faster in countries with a strong banking sector. Our work establishes a novel
channel through which ￿nance a⁄ects the real economy. It also complements the
literature that has stressed legally binding contracts as a standard way to promote
investment in relationship-speci￿c assets.
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1The distinguishing feature of relationship-speci￿c assets is the fact that their value
is greater within a relationship than outside it. A typical example involves an upstream
supplier who makes investments in order to customize her product for the needs of the
downstream purchaser. After the investment is sunk, the buyer can refuse to meet her
commitment and trigger ex post renegotiation. The seller is in a weaker position as she
already adjusted the product for the needs of one speci￿c purchaser and would thus not
be able to achieve the original price with a di⁄erent customer. Existing literature going
back to the Nobel prize winning work of Oliver Williamson (1971, 1975, 1979) sees this
well-known holdup problem as the ultimate reason why agents underinvest in relationship-
speci￿c assets.1 In the above example forward-looking sellers would be reluctant to adjust
their products to the speci￿c needs of their customers, hurting the downstream ￿rms
with negative rami￿cations for aggregate growth. Consequently, the standard way for
the government to stimulate relationship-speci￿c investment would be a well-functioning
legal enforcement of written contracts.
This paper looks beyond the holdup problem and stresses two other reasons be-
hind suppliers￿underinvestment in relationship-speci￿c assets: ￿nancial vulnerability and
short-term planning horizon of buyers. Firstly, even if a detailed contract makes the buyer
willing to pay for a product at the agreed price, she might be not able to do so due to liq-
uidity or solvency problems. The most e⁄ective contract enforcement might fail to protect
the supplier in tough times when the buyer lacks access to a reliable source of ￿nancing.
The recent ￿nancial crisis made this point painfully clear. Secondly, the probability of
buyer￿ s opportunistic behaviour depends on her planning horizon. A long-term oriented
downstream ￿rm would arguably prefer to establish permanent business relationships
rather than aim for one-shot gains from defaulting on the original commitments.
An upstream ￿rm suspecting a ￿nancially unstable or shortsighted contractual partner
would be therefore notably reluctant to make speci￿c product adjustments. By impli-
cation, a buyer dependent on the willingness of her supplier to undertake relationship-
speci￿c investment would particularly bene￿t from being creditworthy and shunning my-
opic behaviour. However, a ￿rm usually cannot disclose such qualities in an easy and
credible way. Contrary to the standard holdup problem, a well-functioning legal system
is here of little avail. It is rather the banking sector that can overcome this information
asymmetry and help the buyer to convince a supplier hesitating to undertake relationship-
speci￿c investment. In a seminal paper, Fama (1985) argues that obtaining a bank loan is
1See also the seminal paper of Klein et al. (1978). Hart (1995) and Royal Swedish Academy of Science
(2009) provide an intuitive introduction to this literature.
2a particularly suitable way to signal creditworthiness to business partners. Similarly, von
Thadden (1995) shows how a monitoring contract closely resembling a standard bank-￿rm
lending relationship can lengthen the ￿rms￿planning horizon.
Consequently, a well-developed ￿nancial (especially banking) system should dispro-
portionately boost industries dependent on the willingness of their business partners to
undertake relationship-speci￿c investments. We con￿rm this theoretical prediction by
attesting that industries requiring a high share of relationship-speci￿c inputs grow faster
in countries with a well developed ￿nancial system. Furthermore, we provide evidence
that this e⁄ect comes from a more developed banking sector rather than from a deeper
stock market.
Consistent with the theoretical arguments of Fama (1985) and von Thadden (1995),
our channel works mostly via increased entry of new ￿rms (extensive margin) and higher
capital accumulation. New ￿rms especially need to signal their creditworthiness in order
to stimulate relationship-speci￿c investment from their business partners. Existing ￿rms
have already established a reputation with the suppliers and depend less on the signals
from third parties like banks. Similarly, the increased planning horizon should a⁄ect
sectoral output growth primarily via higher capital accumulation.
This paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, it provides evidence for a
novel channel through which ￿nance a⁄ects the real economy. Since the seminal work
of Rajan and Zingales (1998), the ￿nance-growth literature has placed special emphasis
on the role of ￿nancial development in relaxing credit constraints. In our story a well-
developed banking sector reassures the suppliers that hesitate to undertake irreversible
relationship-speci￿c investments.
Second, our paper complements the existing literature on economic speci￿city that has
focused on the holdup problem and thus implied comprehensive and enforceable contracts
as a standard way to promote investment in relationship-speci￿c assets. This paper shows
that the domestic ￿nancial system plays an autonomous and equally important role in
stimulating relationship-speci￿c investment by the upstream suppliers, thus promoting
the growth of their downstream customers.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides theoretical
background for our hypothesis. Section II explains the methodology and describes the
data. Section III presents evidence from a broad cross-section of countries. Section IV
concludes.
3I Theoretical Motivation
An in￿ uential body of theoretical literature (Klein et al. 1978, Williamson 1979, Gross-
man and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990, Caballero and Hammour 1998) argues that
rational agents underinvest in assets whose value is higher inside relationship than outside
it. According to these authors the reason lies in possible opportunistic behaviour of the
contractual partner. A supplier investing into adjustment of her product to the speci￿c
needs of one particular buyer is creating an appropriable specialized quasi rent. After
such relationship-speci￿c investment is sunk, an opportunistic buyer can renege on the
original contract and try to appropriate the quasi rent during a renegotiating process.
The supplier will not be able to prevent such development unless she can use legal means
to enforce the original contract.
The recent literature on trade and incomplete contracts builds upon this insight and
identi￿es a prominent role for institutional quality in reassuring a supplier undertaking
relationship-speci￿c investment. Levchenko (2007) develops a theoretical model suggest-
ing institutional quality as a source of comparative advantage in industries requiring
relationship-speci￿c investment from their suppliers. Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007)
empirically con￿rm this prediction by showing that these industries perform better in
the export markets if their home country possesses superior judicial quality and contract
enforcement.
The existing literature on economic speci￿city thus focuses on the holdup problem -
a deliberate abuse of power from the buyer after the supplier has sunk the relationship-
speci￿c investment. However, there are two aspects to the relationship-speci￿c investment
that in our opinion have not received adequate attention. First is the possibility of
￿nancial problems of the downstream customer. A detailed written contract is of little
help for the supplier, if the buyer turns out to be unable to pay the bill. The ￿nancial
consequences for the party undertaking relationship-speci￿c investment might be even
more severe in this case. Now the buyer does not just try to renegotiate the original
contract, she is objectively not able to meet her ￿nancial commitment. The supplier
will thus de￿nitely have to ￿nd a new buyer for a product adjusted for the needs of the
original customer. Second aspect involves the length of the buyer￿ s planning horizon.
The holdup literature emphasizes the immediate monetary gain for a ￿rm that defaults
on the original contract. In a real corporate world, the buyer would also consider the
costs of such action in terms of alienating her business partner. The planning horizon
of the downstream ￿rm is a crucial factor in this costs-bene￿ts analysis. A shortsighted
4buyer would be much more willing to endanger a long-term business relationship in order
to achieve a short-term gain from renegotiating the original contract.
A supplier usually cannot observe the true ￿nancial situation or planning horizon of
the buyer. However, theoretical work on ￿nancial intermediaries suggests that a buyer
can signal both creditworthiness and a long-term planning horizon via obtaining a loan
or a line of credit from her bank.
Fama and Jensen (1983) noticed that most agents in organizations have contracts
promising them ￿xed payo⁄s or incentive payo⁄s tied to speci￿c measures of performance.
This ￿rst group of agents is rather heterogenous and includes both suppliers and outside
debtholders like banks. A second group of agents called residual claimants (owners of
the company) then receives the di⁄erence between stochastic in￿ ows of resources and
￿xed payments promised to the ￿rst group. Fama and Jensen (1985) point out that the
con￿ icts of interest between suppliers and residual claimants are similar to those between
debtholders and residual claimants. It would be therefore ine¢ cient if both suppliers
and debtholders independently monitored the actions of residual claimants. According
to Fama (1985) bank loans are particularly suitable to avoid duplication of information
and monitoring costs. In case of a default, bank loans have usually low priority among
the contracts promising ￿xed payo⁄s. The renewal process of short-term bank loans thus
implies a regular assessment of the borrower￿ s ability to meet such contracts and signals
the reliability of the borrower. Suppliers and other agents with ￿xed payo⁄s consider
those signals to be credible, as the bank backs them with its own resources. The value
of such signals can be seen in the fact that many ￿rms pay monitoring fees for lines of
credit without e⁄ectively taking the o⁄ered resources (Fama 1985, p. 37).
There is a closely related strand of literature explaining the existence of ￿nancial
intermediaries as a natural response to asymmetric information between borrowers and
lenders (Leland and Pyle 1977). According to Diamond (1984) the lenders delegate the
costly task of monitoring the loan contracts to an intermediary in order to avoid the alter-
native of either e⁄ort duplication or a free-rider problem. Von Thadden (1995) provides
a dynamic interpretation of this framework. In his model a ￿rm dependent on external
￿nance may undertake short-term investments which yield lower long-run returns, but
minimize the risk of early termination by outside investors. Von Thadden (1995) shows
how a monitoring contract closely resembling a standard credit-line agreement can help
to overcome this myopia problem. A standard bank-￿rm lending relationship can thus
eliminate the short-term bias in investment and lengthen the ￿rms￿planning horizon.
The presence of relationship-speci￿c assets is in our opinion an important factor de-
5termining the economic value of signals associated with the bank loans. A supplier of
standardized products can always ￿nd another buyer if the original customer is either
not able or not willing to ful￿l the original contract. A supplier of relationship-speci￿c
products has much more to lose if her customer lacks ￿nancial robustness or long-term
planning horizon. Consequently, a buyer dependent on the willingness of her supplier
to undertake a su¢ cient level of relationship-speci￿c investment would disproportion-
ately bene￿t from positive signals a bank loan can provide. Combining the insights from
the literature on relationship-speci￿c investment with the theoretical literature about
monitoring and signalling role of ￿nancial intermediaries thus yields a testable empirical
implication. A strong banking sector bene￿ts disproportionately those industries that
rely on the relationship-speci￿c investment from their suppliers.
It is important to realize that the main hypothesis of the paper relies on unique
characteristics of banks that cannot be easily replicated by stock markets or other ￿nancial
institutions. Firstly, the theoretical mechanisms of Fama (1985) and von Thadden (1995)
depend on the monitoring skills of banks in the presence of information asymmetries.
Many prominent theories of ￿nancial intermediation see this ability to monitor the ￿rms
as the main advantage of banks over public markets (Boot 2000, Ongena and Smith
1998). Secondly, a buyer eager to reassure a supplier of relationship-speci￿c products
would particularly bene￿t from another comparative advantage of banks: their capability
to support the borrowers in ￿nancially di¢ cult times. Ongena and Smith (1998) identify
such ￿leaning against the wind￿as one of the historical tasks of banks, citing a source
from the early 19th century. Financial intermediaries have retained this insurance role
up to the present day. Building upon the work by Kashyap et al. (2002) a recent strand
of ￿nance literature (Gatev and Strahan 2006, Gatev et al. 2006, 2009) sees banks as
￿liquidity provider of last resort￿during ￿nancial crises. In this line of argument banks
enjoy the status of safe haven for investors due to the explicit and implicit government
backing. In the time of ￿nancial distress banks therefore experience in￿ ow of funds from
public markets. Banking system can use these additional resources to meet increased
demand for credits by ￿rms hit by the very same ￿nancial hardship. As banks gain
additional funds at the same time when ￿rms need them most, they are able to o⁄er
the insurance against market-wide liquidity shocks at lower costs than other ￿nancial
institutions.
Due to their missing safe haven status and intrinsically anonymous character, stock
markets are at comparative disadvantage when it comes to insuring and monitoring their
borrowers. Public markets are therefore less likely to reassure a supplier who demands
6credible signals about her customer￿ s ￿nancial robustness before adjusting a product to
some buyer-speci￿c requirements. Shleifer and Summers (1998) go even one step further
and discuss a possible negative impact of stock markets on the relationship-speci￿c invest-
ment between a ￿rm and its suppliers. After a hostile takeover the new owners can easier
renege on existing implicit contracts of the ￿rm in order to transfer relationship-speci￿c
rents from suppliers and other stakeholders to the shareholders. Shleifer and Summers
argue that such a transfer is the true rationale behind many takeovers. Consequently, a
seller might be more reluctant to invest in relationship-speci￿c inputs if assertive stock
markets can expropriate the resulting rents.
II Methodology and Data
A Empirical Model
The question whether ￿nancial development promotes growth or merely follows the real
economy goes back at least to Schumpeter (1912) and Robinson (1952) and might be
the crucial one in the whole ￿nance-growth literature. This endogeneity issue is the
main reason why the research focus in the ￿eld gradually shifted towards di⁄erences-in-
di⁄erences estimations. These econometric techniques compare the di⁄erence in outcome
for treated and control groups before and after a treatment and are more suitable to
address the endogeneity and omitted variables biases often present in traditional growth
regressions. We also rely on this approach in order to establish a causal link from ￿nance
to relationship-speci￿c investment and then to economic growth.2
In the next section we apply the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and
estimate the following equation:
Gic = ￿ + ￿CIi ￿ FDc + ￿Xic + ￿i + ￿c + "ic; (1)
where the subscripts i and c indicate industry and country, respectively. As a dependent
variable we use several proxies for industrial growth: growth of output, growth of the
number of establishments, growth of output per establishment, growth of employment,
growth of the capital stock and growth of total factor productivity (TFP). Our variable of
interest is CIi￿FDc, where FDc is the ￿nancial development in country c and CIi is the
2Beck (2008) and Levine (2005) discuss in more detail the application of di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence esti-
mations in ￿nance-growth literature.
7contract intensity measure introduced by Nunn (2007), which quanti￿es the importance
of relationship-speci￿c inputs for di⁄erent industries. Xic is a vector of controls and ￿i
and ￿c are industry and country dummies that take care of a wide range of omitted
variables. These ￿xed e⁄ects also absorb the direct e⁄ects of contract intensity CIi and
￿nancial development FDc.3
A positive estimated coe¢ cient for our variable of interest, CIi ￿ FDc, indicates that
￿nancial development bene￿ts especially the industries dependent on the relationship-
speci￿c investment of their suppliers. This would be consistent with the notion that
a ￿nancial system can reassure suppliers by signalling ￿nancial stability and long-term
planning horizon of buyers. Our theoretical motivation stresses the decisive role of ￿nan-
cial intermediaries in this regard. In our paper the term ￿nancial development therefore
applies to the strength of banking sector unless speci￿ed otherwise.
In order to account for alternative channels that might be correlated with our mecha-
nism, we include several interaction terms between various country and industry charac-
teristics into our set of control variables Xic. Speci￿cally, we interact ￿nancial develop-
ment with dependence on external ￿nance (ExFi ￿ FDc) to con￿rm that our results are
not driven by the fact that ￿nance helps industries dependent on external ￿nance (Rajan
and Zingales 1998). Similarly, we include into vector Xic an interaction between rule of
law and contract intensity measure (CIi￿RLc). This controls for the traditional argument
from the holdup literature that e¢ cient legal enforcement stimulates relationship-speci￿c
investment. Similarly to CIi ￿ FDc, we expect a positive coe¢ cient sign for the interac-
tion terms controlling for these two alternative theories. We also put the initial share of
the sector in total output into all regressions. We expect a negative coe¢ cient for this
control variable, as more mature industries have usually less scope for future growth.
It is important to emphasize that the industry characteristic CIi is computed solely
from U.S. industrial data. This approach is based on two assumptions. First, assuming
that U.S. markets are well functioning and (relatively) frictionless, equilibrium variables in
the United States can be taken as good proxies for exogenous technological characteristics
of the production process in a given industry. Second, as long as the relative ranking of
industry characteristics is the same across countries, the technological characteristics of
the U.S. industries are representative of technologies used in other countries. Under these
3Thompson (2011) proposes clustered standard errors as an alternative to the use of dummies when
controlling for ￿xed e⁄ects. Clustering undoubtedly possess some advantages over dummies inclusion, es-
pecially in panel data where time dimension and autocorrelation issues play an important role. However,
dummies explicitly entering the regression are an indispensable part of the Rajan-Zingales methodology
applied in a broad cross-section of countries and industries.
8assumptions we can interpret the estimated coe¢ cients for the interactions of country and
industry characteristics in a causal way. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998) we also
drop the United States from our sample to further assure the exogeneity of US based
industrial characteristics in our regressions.
Another crucial point in this econometric approach is the potential endogeneity of
country characteristics like ￿nancial development. Here we follow the ￿nance-growth
literature and use countries￿legal origins to address this issue. We instrument the in-
teraction terms of country characteristics (￿nancial development, rule of law) and indus-
try characteristics (importance of relationship-speci￿c inputs, dependence on external
￿nance) by the interaction terms of the latter variables with legal origin dummies.
Our database has a complex structure with both country and industry dimensions
where heteroskedasticity might be present. If this is the case, the GMM estimator is more
e¢ cient than the simple 2SLS estimator. In the absence of heteroskedasticity the GMM
estimator is asymptotically equivalent to the 2SLS estimator.4 However, the optimal
weighting matrix that is used in the e¢ cient GMM procedure is a function of fourth
moments. Obtaining reasonable estimate of fourth moments requires large sample size.
As a result, the e¢ cient GMM estimator can have poor small sample properties. If in fact
the error is homoskedastic, 2SLS would be preferable to e¢ cient GMM in small sample.
In our main speci￿cation we perform the heteroskedasticity test proposed by Pagan and
Hall (1983) and reject the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity at 1% level. Therefore
we rely on GMM estimation for our analysis.
B Data
The international industry-level data come from the Trade, Production, and Protection
Database by Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) that covers up to 100 countries over the period
1976 to 2004. It uses production data from the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO) that are reported according to the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2 classi-
￿cation. We transform data from current U.S. dollars into constant international dollars
using capital and GDP de￿ ator from Penn World Table (Heston, Summers, and Aten,
2002). We drop the observations from the United States, as the industry characteristics
in our analysis are computed from the US data. The resulting sample includes data for
28 manufacturing industries in 90 countries for the period between 1980 and 2004. The
4Baum et al. (2003) discuss the advantages of using GMM over 2SLS in the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity in the error term.
9list of the countries used in our sample is reported in Appendix A.
We construct a country-industry dataset by averaging variables over the period 1980-
2004. Similarly to the paper of Rajan and Zingales (1998), eliminating the time dimension
allows us to use legal origins as instruments for endogenous country characteristics like
￿nancial development. We use the earliest available data for industry share to construct
the initial industry share. In this way we avoid losing too many observations, as not all
countries report the data for 1980.
In order to test our main hypothesis on the di⁄erentiated impact of ￿nancial de-
velopment across industries, we borrow the notion of contract-intensive (institutionally
intensive) sectors from the recent trade literature on incomplete contracts and compar-
ative advantage (Nunn 2007, Levchenko 2007). Following Nunn (2007), we rely on the
variable contract intensity that measures for every industry the proportion of intermedi-
ate inputs requiring relationship-speci￿c investment. Based on the classi￿cation by Rauch
(1999), these inputs cannot be sold on an organized exchange, nor are they reference-
priced in trade publications.5 The non-existence of an organized exchange or reference
price suggests some non-standard feature of the product. If a producer requires a non-
standardized intermediate good for production, the supplier has to undertake ex ante
investment in order to customize it. The value of such speci￿c input is higher inside a
buyer-seller relationship than outside it. Moreover, in the absence of organized exchange
or reference price the supplier might have a hard time selling her product at the original
price if the initial buyer is unable or unwilling to pay. Given that the original measure
in Nunn (2007) is reported in the US input-otput classi￿cation, we use the measure of
contract intensity from Levchenko (2008) who recomputes it for the 3-digit ISIC Revision
2 classi￿cation.
The second industry characteristics we use is the measure of external ￿nance depen-
dence introduced by Rajan and Zingales (1998). It is de￿ned as capital expenditure minus
cash ￿ ow divided by capital expenditure. The original variable from Rajan and Zingales
(1998) is calculated for a mix of three-digit and four-digit ISIC industries. The version
of the measure used in our paper comes from Laeven et al. (2002) and follows the 3-digit
ISIC Revision 2 classi￿cation.
The data for ￿nancial development is taken from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine
(2000), which contains various indicators of ￿nancial development across countries and
5Rauch (1999) classi￿es SITC Rev. 2 industries according to three possible types of its ￿nal good:
di⁄erentiated, reference-priced, and homogeneous. Naturally, the ￿nal good of an industry can serve as
intermediate input for other industries.
10over time. In our analysis, we use two proxies for ￿nancial development: private credit by
banks to GDP and stock market capitalization to GDP, the standard proxies for ￿nancial
development in the empirical literature. Due to possible endogeneity concerns we use the
initial level of ￿nancial development, measured in 1980 or earliest year available.
The data for quality of legal institutions, the "rule of law", is taken from the database
constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005). This is the weighted average
of several variables that measure perceived e⁄ectiveness and predictability of the judicial
system and contract enforcement in each country. For our analysis we use data for 1996
which is the earliest available estimate for this variable.
For instrumental variable regressions, we rely on the data of legal origin from Glaeser
et al. (2004). Legal origins are essentially indicator variables. For example, the common
law variable equals one for countries whose legal origin is the British common law and
zero otherwise. The remaining legal origins include French civil law, German civil law
and Socialist law. The omitted variable is Scandinavian civil law.
In Appendices C and D we present data sources and summary statistics for our sample.
Appendix E presents the correlation matrix for the interaction terms of country and
industry variables that we use in the empirical analysis.
III Empirical Evidence
A OLS Estimation: Banks, Law and Stock Markets
Table I reports the results of estimating equation (1) using OLS. The dependent variable is
the average output growth in industry i and country c. The ￿rst column of Table I reports
the estimation results of our baseline speci￿cation which includes the industry￿ s share in
country￿ s GDP at the beginning of the sample period and the interaction term of contract
intensity and ￿nancial development. Following our theoretical motivation we use the ratio
of private credit by banks to GDP as proxy for ￿nancial development. The estimated
coe¢ cient for the interaction term CIi￿FDc is positive and statistically signi￿cant at the
one percent level. This corroborates the hypothesis that a strong banking sector promotes
especially industries dependent on the relationship-speci￿c investment of their suppliers.
The initial industry share has the expected negative sign, con￿rming the idea that more
mature industries with a high share in country￿ s GDP have less scope for further growth.
[Table I about here]
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statistically signi￿cant but also economically relevant. The industrial sector most depen-
dent on relationship-speci￿c inputs is "transport equipment". According to the estimate
from the ￿rst column of Table I, a catch-up in Mexico￿ s ￿nancial development with the
average OECD level would give the growth rate of this sector an additional boost of
5.3%.6
The subsequent columns present the regression results with an augmented set of ex-
planatory variables. Columns (2) and (3) control for alternative economic channels which
already found considerable empirical support and might be correlated with our mecha-
nism. Recent trade literature (Nunn 2007, Levchenko 2007) has shown that the industries
with a high share of relationship-speci￿c inputs bene￿t disproportionately from a good
contracting environment. Financial development FDc might be correlated with legal and
contracting institutions in country c. In such case the variable of interest CIi￿FDc would
also capture the e⁄ect of superior institutions on the contract-intensive industries. We
control for this possibility by adding an interaction term of the contract intensity measure
with institutional quality proxied by the rule of law (CIi ￿ RLc) in the second column
of Table I. Another omitted variable bias can arise from the industry characteristic CIi.
Contract-intensive industries might well be the industries that require larger external
funds to support their operations. If so, then our main interaction CIi ￿ FDc would
also capture the bene￿cial e⁄ect of ￿nancial development on the industries dependent on
external ￿nance (Rajan and Zingales 1998). In the third column we therefore include
an interaction term of industry￿ s dependence on external ￿nance and country￿ s ￿nancial
development (ExFi ￿ FDc). In both augmented speci￿cations the variable of interest
CIi ￿ FDc maintains a positive and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cient. The coe¢ cients
for the two other interactions, while positive, fail to have statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect.7
In the last three columns we test the hypothesis about the singular role of banks
as promoters of industries requiring relationship-speci￿c investment from their suppli-
ers. Country level studies document a positive e⁄ect of both bank and stock market
development on long run economic growth (Levine and Zervos 1998). Our mechanism,
6This is calculated as follows. Mexico￿ s ratio of private credit to GDP is 0.16 and OECD average is
0.532. The coe¢ cient of the interaction term is 0.167. If Mexico￿ s ￿nancial development reached the
level of OECD average, then the growth rate in the "transport equipment" industry would increase by:
￿ ￿ CI ￿ 4FD = 0:167 ￿ 0:859 ￿ (0:532 ￿ 0:16) ￿ 5:3%
7The insigni￿cance of the two controls arises not due to some peculiar features of our sample, but is
indeed the consequence of controlling for our main channel. When we repeat the estimation in the second
and third column without our main variable CIi ￿FDc (not reported), both CIi ￿RLc and ExFi ￿FDc
are statistically signi￿cant at the 5% level.
12however, depends crucially on the unique capacity of banks to reassure the sellers of
relationship-speci￿c inputs via signalling the ￿nancial robustness and long-term planning
horizon of the buyers. The regressions in columns (4) to (6) mirror the estimation of
the previous three columns, but add the interaction terms of stock market capitalization
over GDP with contract intensity (CIi ￿StMc) and with dependence on external ￿nance
(ExFi ￿ StMc) into the set of explanatory variables. The main interaction capturing the
strength of banking sector CIi ￿ FDc remains positive and statistically signi￿cant at 1%
level. The interaction term of the stock market capitalization to GDP with the contract
intensity measure CIi ￿ StMc is never signi￿cant and even enters the regressions with a
negative sign. The results con￿rm the dominance of banks over anonymous stock markets
in fostering the industries requiring relationship-speci￿c investment from their suppliers.
The econometric horse-race thus veri￿es our theoretical motivation and we focus on the
banking sector (FDc) in the rest of the paper.
B Instrumental Variables Estimation
The results of the OLS estimation cannot be taken as conclusive evidence for our main
hypothesis due to the possibility of reverse causality a⁄ecting both country characteris-
tics (￿nancial development FDc and rule of law RLc) used in previous regressions. If
industries requiring a high share of relationship-speci￿c inputs contribute disproportion-
ately to overall economic growth, the country might have stronger incentives to invest
in ￿nancial and institutional development. To take care of this potential endogeneity
problem, we use countries￿legal origins to construct our instrumental variables, follow-
ing the existing literature.8 Speci￿cally, we interact the contract intensity CIi with four
variables: BRITc, FRc, GERc, and SOCc. These are dummy variables equal to one if
country c has British, French, German, or Socialist legal origin, respectively. The omit-
ted category is the Scandinavian legal origin SCANc. We use the resulting interaction
terms CIi ￿ BRITc, CIi ￿ FRc, CIi ￿ GERc, and CIi ￿ SOCc as instruments for the en-
dogenous interaction terms CIi ￿ FDc and CIi ￿ RLc. We also multiply the dependence
on external ￿nance ExFi with legal origins variables. This yields four more interactions
(ExFi ￿ BRITc, ExFi ￿ FRc, ExFi ￿ GERc, and ExFi ￿ SOCc) which we use as addi-
tional instruments in estimations containing the endogenous variable ExFi ￿ FDc. In
this way we instrument every endogenous interaction term by appropriate interactions
8La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) show that the origin of the legal system a⁄ects investor protection and
￿nancial development. Djankov et al. (2003) ￿nd that legal origin has an impact on judicial quality and
contract enforcement.
13of industry characteristics and legal origins dummies. Such approach enables to combine
the instrumentation with a proper control for theoretical mechanisms di⁄erent from ours.
Table II presents results of the instrumental variable (GMM) estimation of equation
(1). The ￿rst three columns are the GMM analogue for the ￿rst three columns from
Table I. The coe¢ cient for the interaction term of the contract intensity measure and
bank credit to GDP remains positive and signi￿cant at least at 5% level in all three
speci￿cations. The coe¢ cient for the rule of law interaction becomes signi￿cant at 5%
level as well, suggesting that contract-intensive industries bene￿ts from both legal and
￿nancial development. The interaction term of external ￿nance dependence and bank
credit remains positive but insigni￿cant after instrumentation.
[Table II about here]
At the bottom of Table II, we report the weak instrument test suggested by Stock
and Yogo (2002), the partial R-squared measure suggested by Shea (1997) and the Sar-
gan/Hansen test of overindentifying restrictions. The ￿rst stage statistics con￿rm that
our excluded instruments are highly correlated with the endogenous variables. The F
statistics from the ￿rst stage regressions are mostly above 26. The somewhat lower value
for the third speci￿cation is probably due to the higher number of instruments.9 How-
ever, it is still above the rule of thumb value of 10 proposed by Stock and Yogo. We also
report the Cragg-Donald statistic suggested by Stock and Yogo in the presence of several
endogenous regressors.10 Both tests reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. The
Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions checks the validity of the instruments:
the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term under the null hypothesis. The test
rejects this null hypothesis at 10% level of signi￿cance in two out of three speci￿cations,
implying that our set of instruments does not satisfy the required orthogonality condition.
Some of the instruments might be either not truly exogenous or incorrectly excluded from
the regression.
Legal origin can in￿ uence di⁄erent spheres of economic and political life of the coun-
try which might pose problems when using it as instrument. In our case the ￿nancial
and institutional development are highly correlated with overall economic progress. For
9Four interaction terms of external ￿nance dependence related to the Rajan and Zingales (1998)
channel (ExFi ￿ BRITc, ExFi ￿ FRc, ExFi ￿ GERc, and ExFi ￿ SOCc) add up to four instruments
(CIi￿BRITc, CIi￿FRc, CIi￿GERc, and CIi￿SOCc) a¢ liated to our main endogenous term CIi￿FDc.
10The critical values of the Cragg-Donald statistics are tabulated in Stock and Yogo (2002).
14example, sectors with a high share of relationship-speci￿c inputs might also require a dis-
proportionate share of skilled labour or modern technologies. These sectors might then
grow faster in developed countries that happen to be rich in human capital and operate
on the technological frontier. To take care of this problem, we add the interaction terms
of the industry dummies with the log of real GDP per worker into regression equation.11
The overall economic development can now a⁄ect each sector in an unrestricted way via
those interactions. We thus explicitly control for the possibility that developed countries
have some (possibly unobservable) features that facilitate growth in contract-intensive
industries.12
We report the results of the GMM estimation with industry dummies interactions in
columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table II. Comparing these last three columns with columns
(1)-(3) documents the robustness of our mechanism to this more stringent speci￿cation.
The coe¢ cient for the variable of interest CIi ￿FDc slightly decreases in the presence of
industry dummies interactions, but remains positive and signi￿cant. Columns (2) and (5)
o⁄er probably the most interesting comparison. Controlling for di⁄erentiated impact of
economic development across industries in the ￿fth column decreases the signi￿cance for
both CIi ￿FDc and CIi ￿RLc, but to a very di⁄erent degree. The main interaction term
of contract intensity with bank credit misses the 5% signi￿cance level by the narrowest of
the margins, with p-value reaching 5.1%. In contrast, the interaction term of rule of law
and contract intensity CIi ￿RLc becomes insigni￿cant. In the sixth column the external
￿nance dependence interaction ExFi ￿ FDc remains insigni￿cant and has now even a
negative sign. The Sargan/Hansen statistics clearly improves: now we cannot reject the
null hypothesis of instruments validity at a 10 % level of signi￿cance in two out of three
speci￿cations. The negative result for Sargan/Hansen test in the last column suggests
problems with the set of additional instruments controlling for the channel of dependence
on external ￿nance (see footnote 9).
11Levchenko (2007) uses the interaction terms of industry dummies and economic development while
refraining from the use of instrumental variables. Nunn (2007) relies on legal origins as instruments for
institutional quality, but does not include the industry dummies interactions in the IV regressions. Here
we combine both approaches.
12An alternative way would be to include additional interactions of country and industry characteris-
tics in our instrumental variable estimation, but it would be extremely di¢ cult to control for all possible
channels. There might always be some other unobserved feature of developed countries generating a
higher growth in the sectors relying on relationship-speci￿c investments from their suppliers. Interaction
terms of real income per worker with industry dummies control for all such unobservables. Econometri-
cally, we include 28 additional regressors (number of industries in our sample) in our regression.
15C Decomposing Banks￿Pro-Growth E⁄ect
So far we have provided evidence that a well-developed banking system plays an impor-
tant role in promoting the sectors requiring relationship-speci￿c investments from their
suppliers. In this section we study in more detail the speci￿c channels through which
this link between banks and the real economy operates. We implement two decomposi-
tions of the overall output growth. First, we examine whether our mechanism works on
the extensive margin (via increased entry of new ￿rms) or on the intensive margin (via
accelerated growth of existing ￿rms). Then we carry out a standard growth accounting
exercise testing whether overall growth comes from higher capital accumulation, increased
employment or faster technological progress (TFP growth).
Tables III and IV isolate the extensive and the intensive margin of output growth.
The dependent variables are average growth in number of establishments (Table III) and
average growth per establishment (Table IV). The ￿rst three columns correspond to the
OLS regressions from the ￿rst three columns of Table I, the following six columns mirror
the instrumental variable (GMM) estimation of Table II. Columns (4) to (6) present
the baseline GMM estimation and the last three columns include the interaction terms
of industry dummies with GDP per worker. The results provide clear evidence that the
extensive margin is the driving force behind the positive e⁄ect of a strong banking system
on the sectors with a high share of relationship-speci￿c inputs. In Table III, the variable
of interest CIi ￿ FDc is always positive and statistically signi￿cant. In the case of the
intensive margin (Table IV), the disproportionate positive impact of bank credit over
GDP on the growth of contract-intensive industries is statistically signi￿cant only in two
out of nine speci￿cations. Especially, there is no signi￿cant e⁄ect once we control for the
endogeneity of ￿nancial development and rule of law (columns three to nine).
[Table III about here]
[Table IV about here]
These results suggest that banks facilitate the creation of new ￿rms in contract-
intensive industries rather than helping the existing companies to expand. This is in line
with the signalling channel by Fama (1985). A new buyer with no existing record of
ful￿lling her commitment faces more wariness from the suppliers of relationship-speci￿c
inputs. Consequently, she is heavily dependent on credible signals about her ￿nancial
stability that arise from a successfully obtained bank loan. In contrast, an existing ￿rm
16has usually already built up a stable network of business partners. An established buyer
can thus rely more on her own reputation and familiarity with suppliers and less on
reputational signals from third parties like banks.
The prevalence of the extensive margin in our channel also complements the previous
￿ndings of Fisman and Love (2003). These authors argue that after a long-term successful
business relationship a supplier can assess the true ￿nancial situation of the buyer better
than a ￿nancial intermediary. In accordance with this conjecture they show that in poorly
developed ￿nancial markets trade credit from suppliers can substitute for standard bank
loans. Crucially, their result holds only at intensive and not at extensive margin. Taken
together, the evidence from Fisman and Love (2003) and our paper suggests that banks
[suppliers] have superior information about the ￿nancial health of new [established] ￿rms.
Next, we analyze the e⁄ect of ￿nancial development on sectors with a high share of
relationship-speci￿c inputs within the growth accounting framework. In order to do so, we
reconstruct capital stock using the methodology of Hall and Jones (1999) and TFP using
the methodology of Solow (1957). Appendix B provides details of the procedure. Tables
V to VII summarize the outcome of this second channel decomposition. The dependent
variables are average growth of capital (Table V), average growth in employment (Table
VI) and average TFP growth (Table VII). Again, the ￿rst three columns report the OLS
estimations, the following three present the results of the baseline GMM estimation and
the last three columns report the results of the GMM estimation augmented with the
interactions of industry dummies and GDP per worker.
The growth accounting suggests a higher capital accumulation as the most important
source of the banking sector￿ s bene￿cial impact on the industries relying on relationship-
speci￿c investment from their suppliers. After correcting for the endogeneity of ￿nancial
and institutional development in columns (4) to (9) of Table V, the variable of interest
CIi ￿ FDc becomes highly statistically signi￿cant. This positive e⁄ect of bank credit
on capital growth in the contract-intensive industries provides empirical support for the
theoretical channel proposed by von Thadden (1995). A higher capital accumulation
would be a ￿rst-order implication of a theoretical mechanism working through bank loans
attenuating the short-term investment bias and increasing the ￿rms￿planning horizon.
[Table V about here]
We have less clear-cut evidence for a positive role of the banking system in boosting
employment in industries with a high share of relationship-speci￿c inputs. In Table
17VI the estimated coe¢ cient for the main interaction CIi ￿ FDc is always positive and
mostly signi￿cant. Still, the relationship between ￿nancial development and employment
growth in the contract-intensive industries appears less robust than in the case of capital
accumulation.
[Table VI about here]
There is no evidence that the banking system promotes productivity growth in the
sectors dependent on relationship-speci￿c investment from their suppliers. Table VII
presents the estimation results with TFP growth as a dependent variable. The results in
the ￿rst three columns show the interaction term of bank credit and contract intensity
entering the OLS regressions at the 10% level of signi￿cance. Once we control for endo-
geneity (last six columns), this signi￿cance disappears and sometimes the main variable
CIi ￿ FDc enters with a negative sign.
[Table VII about here]
Overall, the two decompositions performed in this subsection suggest that a strong
banking system promotes industries with a high share of relationship-speci￿c inputs
mainly via increased entry of new ￿rms and higher capital accumulation. These re-
sults con￿rm the empirical relevance of the theoretical channels emphasizing bank loans
as a signalling device for ￿nancial stability (Fama 1985) and as a source of long-term
investment planning horizon for the ￿rms (von Thadden 1995).
IV Conclusion
Several prominent papers (Williamson 1971, 1979, Klein et al. 1978, Grossman and Hart
1986, Hart and Moore 1990) argue that a rational agent (e.g. upstream supplier) tends to
underinvest in relationship-speci￿c assets as she will eventually face opportunistic actions
from her contractual partner (downstream purchaser). A legally binding contract between
the two parties is the standard proposal to alleviate the adverse economic consequences
of this holdup problem. The recent trade literature (Nunn 2007, Levchenko 2007) builds
upon this insight and demonstrates the bene￿cial impact of contract-enforcing institutions
on sectors with a high share of relationship-speci￿c inputs.
18This paper looks beyond the holdup problem and proposes a di⁄erent way to stimulate
relationship-speci￿c investment. The presented empirical results suggest that ￿nancial
development might be at least as vital as legal enforcement for the economic performance
of industries dependent on suppliers￿willingness to invest in relationship-speci￿c assets.13
A well-developed banking sector seems especially important in this regard.
This is not to say that institutions do not play a potentially important role in the
development of industries requiring relationship-speci￿c investments from their suppliers.
An in￿ uential strand of literature (e.g. Levine et al. 2000) argues that good institutions
including contract enforcement can boost ￿nancial development. Thus, one possible
interpretation of our results would be that superior institutions promote investments into
relationship-speci￿c assets indirectly via their positive impact on the level of ￿nancial
development.
Needless to say, much more work is needed to disentangle the e⁄ects of ￿nance and
institutions on industries using relationship-speci￿c inputs. For one thing, there is an
issue of a possible non-monotonicity between contract enforcement and ￿nance, brie￿ y
raised by Levine et al. (2000). The theoretical literature explains the very existence
of ￿nancial intermediaries as the consequence of market imperfections (e.g. Boyd and
Prescott 1985). In a world with perfect contract enforcement, there would be less reasons
to have ￿nancial intermediaries in the ￿rst place. Moreover, various deep determinants of
economic growth like culture or human capital can drive both ￿nancial and institutional
development. We leave those issues for further research.
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23Appendix A: Country List
Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Bangladesh; Benin; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil;
Bulgaria; Cameroon; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cote d￿ Ivoire; Cyprus; Czech
Republic; Denmark; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Ethiopia; Finland; France; Gabon;
Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Honduras; Hong Kong; Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia;
Iran; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Jordan; Kenya; Korea (Republic of); Kuwait; Kyrgyzs-
tan; Latvia; Lithuania; Macao; Malawi; Malaysia; Malta; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova;
Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nigeria; Norway;
Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Romania; Russia;
Senegal; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sweden;
Switzerland; Tanzania; Thailand; Trinidad &Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; United Kingdom;
Uruguay; Venezuela; Yemen
Appendix B: Reconstructing Capital Stock and Total Factor Productivity
The capital stock in industry i, country c and year t is given by:
Kict = (1 ￿ ￿)Kict￿1 + Iict
We use a depreciation rate ￿ = 0:08, and use the standard assumption that initial




We compute total factor productivity at the industry level using the following formula:
lnTFPict = lnYict ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ic)lnKict ￿ ￿ic lnLict
where Yict is the total output, Kict is the capital stock and Lict is the total employment
in the sector.
The ￿ic is computed as the average of the total wage bill divided by value added for
sector i for the US data,14 this will allow us to avoid unduly reduction in our sample to
the countries that have available data for value added and wage payment.
14Levchenko, Ranciere and Thoening (2008) who use similiar database to analyze the e⁄ect of ￿nancial
liberalization on industry growth show that results do not change if a country￿ s average labour share of




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Table I: Industry Growth - OLS
The dependent variable is the output growth in industry i and country c. All regressions are estimated by the OLS
and include country and industry ￿xed e⁄ects. Our main variable of interest is (CIi*FDc): interaction between
contract intensity of industry i (measure of importance of relationship-speci￿c inputs computed from US data) and
￿nancial development in country c (ratio of bank credit to GDP). In all regressions we control for Initial industry
share: the share of industry i in manufacturing output of country c at the beginning of the sample period. Other
control variables are (CIi*RLc): interaction between contract intensity of industry i and rule of law in country c
(quality of legal institutions); (ExFi*FDc): interaction between external ￿nance dependence of industry i (capital
expenditure minus cash ￿ow divided by capital expenditure computed from US data) and ￿nancial development in
country c; (CIi*StMc): interaction between contract intensity of industry i and stock market strength in country
c (ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP); (ExFi*StMc): interaction between external ￿nance dependence of
industry i and stock market strength in country c. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical signi￿cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial industry share -0.428* -0.461** -0.430* -0.180** -0.181** -0.183**
(0.223) (0.234) (0.223) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073)
Contract intensity 0.167*** 0.140*** 0.152*** 0.166*** 0.157*** 0.165***
x Bank credit (CIi*FDc) (0.051) (0.049) (0.051) (0.060) (0.059) (0.062)
Contract intensity 0.077 0.040
x Rule of law (CIi*RLc) (0.083) (0.092)
External ￿nance dependence 0.023 0.002
x Bank credit (ExFi*FDc) (0.021) (0.025)
Contract intensity -0.018 -0.027 -0.029
x Stock market (CIi*StMc) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
External ￿nance dependence 0.018
x Stock market (ExFi*StMc) (0.018)
Constant 0.083* 0.080* 0.084* 0.031** 0.025 0.032**
(0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015)
Observations 2,313 2,290 2,313 2,136 2,136 2,136
R2 0.259 0.262 0.259 0.260 0.260 0.260
28Table II: Industry Growth - IV
The dependent variable is the output growth in industry i and country c. All regressions include country and industry ￿xed
e⁄ects. The variables are de￿ned in Table I. The regressions are instrumental variable (GMM) estimations. We use countries￿
legal origins to construct instrumental variables in order to control for the possible endogeneity of country characteristics
(￿nancial development FDc and rule of law RLc). Speci￿cally, we interact the contract intensity CIi with four variables:
BRITc, FRc, GERc, and SOCc. These are dummy variables equal to one if country c has British, French, German, or
Socialist legal origin, respectively. The omitted category is the Scandinavian legal origin SCANc. The resulting interaction
terms CIi*BRITc, CIi*FRc, CIi*GERc, and CIi*SOCc are instruments for the endogenous interaction terms (CIi*FDc
and CIi*RLc). We also multiply the dependence on external ￿nance ExFi with legal origins variables. This yields four
more interactions (ExFi*BRITc, ExFi*FRc, ExFi*GERc, and ExFi*SOCc) used as additional instruments in estimations
containing the endogenous variable ExFi*FDc (columns three and six). In this way we instrument every endogenous
interaction term by appropriate interactions of industry characteristics and legal origins dummies. The regressions in the
columns (4) to (6) include interaction terms of the industry dummies with the log of real GDP per worker. The overall
economic development can a⁄ect each sector in an unrestricted way via those interactions. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signi￿cance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Initial industry share -0.378* -0.570*** -0.211 -0.468** -0.600*** -0.307
(0.196) (0.220) (0.188) (0.198) (0.216) (0.188)
Contract intensity 0.171*** 0.140** 0.142** 0.147** 0.127* 0.135**
x Bank credit (CIi*FDc) (0.065) (0.064) (0.067) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066)
Contract intensity 0.144** 0.161
x Rule of law (CIi*RLc) (0.068) (0.104)
External ￿nance dependence 0.012 -0.013
x Bank credit (ExFi*FDc) (0.034) (0.034)
Constant 0.006 0.064 -0.037 0.220* 0.271* 0.145
(0.093) (0.098) (0.091) (0.134) (0.139) (0.130)
GDP per worker x Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,313 2,290 2,313 2,313 2,290 2,313
R2 0.253 0.257 0.247 0.273 0.277 0.268
Cragg-Donald F statistic 103.5 92.44 46.51 119.1 98.77 56.52
F stat of excl instr 26.05 26.46 13.06 34.83 34.71 17.41
Partial R2 Shea 0.159 0.148 0.153 0.180 0.156 0.176
p value of Hansen test 0.054 0.161 0.005 0.123 0.174 0.031
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